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ARTICLES

THE LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
Malvina Halberstam*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In this paper I will suggest a definition of humanitarian inter
vention, give a brief historical overview of the debate about the
legality of humanitarian intervention, and my conclusions on that
question. I will only touch on the main points; the space allotted
does not permit in-depth analysis.
II.

DEFINITION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

The definition of humanitarian intervention I suggest is: The
use of force by one state in the territory of another to protect per
sons who are in imminent danger of death or grave injury when the
state in whose territory they are is unwilling or unable to protect
them. First, there must be a threat of imminent death or grave
injury. Second, the territorial state must be unwilling or unable to
protect those endangered. A further requirement is that the inter
vening state withdraw once it has rescued those in danger or other
wise averted the danger.
These criteria are similar to those listed by Professor
Schachter for what he states is a "type of humanitarian interven
tion" that is "generally accepted by jurists and many govern
ments," a state's use of force "to rescue or protect its own nationals
in imminent peril of injury in a foreign country."^ The definition
proposed would not, however, limit humanitarian intervention to
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. This article is based on a
paper presented at the Conference on Anarchy in the Third World, sponsored by the
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security, Washing
ton, D.C., June 3-4, 1993. I wish to thank Esther Geuft, Cardozo '93, for her assistance
with this paper.
1 Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice: General Course in Public
International Law, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS 144 (Hague Academy of International Law
1982).
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the protection of nationals.^ The right of people not to be killed
should not depend on whether the state of which they are citizens
is in a position to protect them, wants to protect them, or is itself
the source of the danger. Interestingly, the case which Professor
Schachter considers "the classic application" of permissible human
itarian intervention, the Israeli action in Entebbe^, was not limited
to the rescue of Israeli nationals.
Nor should it be a condition for the legality of the action that
the intervening state is disinterested, as some have urged. States,
like individuals, rarely act from purely idealistic motives.'' The test
of the legality of the intervention should be the effect of the action,
not the motive.^ As long as the action in fact prevented imminent
death or injury and the intervening state withdrew once the danger
was averted, its action falls within the definition of humanitarian
intervention proposed, even if the state also had other motives.
III.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The debate about the legality of humanitarian intervention
may be divided into three periods: Customary International Law;
U.N. Charter; Post-Cold War.
A. Customary International Law
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention goes back a long
time. In their monumental treatise on International Protection of
Human Rights,® Sohn and Buergenthal quote from a book pub
lished in 1579 which "justifies interference 'in behalf of neighbor
ing peoples who are oppressed on account of adherence to the true
religion or by any obvious tyranny.'
Grotius, writing in 1625,
asked "whether a war for the subjects of another be just, for the
2 Accord Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT, IN
TERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 41 (2d ed. 1991) ("The exception, I believe, is

not restricted to actions by a state on behalf of its own nationals."); David Scheffer, To
wards a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 272 (1992).
3 Schachter, supra note 1, at 145.
See RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW,
POLICY AND PRACTICE 627 (2d ed. 1991).
5 Accord ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 222
(1987). ("What may turn out to be decisively important is what happens after the interven
tion.") (emphasis in the original).
® LOUIS B. SOHN AND THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (1973).
7 Id. at 138, citing W. A. DUNNING, POLITICAL THEORIES FROM LUTHER TO MONTES
QUIEU 55 (1579), citing Vmdicae Contra Tyrannos.
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purpose of defending them from injuries inflicted by their ruler,
and answered that it is just if "a tyrant. . . practices atrocities to
wards his subjects which no just man can approve."®
There were also those who opposed humanitarian intervention
under customary international law. They argued that such inter
vention would be misused by one state to gain control over an
other. Thus, an opponent of humanitarian intervention wrote;
Barbarous acts are committed by the thousands every day in
some comer of the globe which no State dreams of stopping be
cause no State has an interest in stopping them.
Whenever one power intervenes in the name of humanity
in the domain of another power, it cannot but impose its con
cept of justice and public policy on the other State, by force if
necessary. Its intervention tends definitely to draw the [other]
State into its moral and social sphere of influence, and ulti
mately into its political sphere of influence. It will control the
other State while preparing to dominate it. Humanitarian inter
vention consequently looks like an ingenious juridical technique
to encroach little by little upon the independence of a State in
order to reduce it progressively to the status of semisovereignty.®

Nevertheless, Sohn and Buergenthal conclude that humanita
rian intervention is lawful under customary international law. In
their view, that conclusion is supported by "weighty authorities"
and "various instances in which the powers have intervened to pre
vent a neighbor from continuing to commit such abuses as consti
tuted a violation of the universally recognized and generally
respected rules of decent state conduct."^"
B. U.N. Charter
After the United Nations was established, the differing posi
tions on the legality of humanitarian intervention took the form of
disagreement about the correct interpretation of the Charter.
Some publicists argued that even if humanitarian intervention was
permissible before the adoption of the U.N. Charter, it was prohib
ited by the Charter." They argued that Article 2(4) of the Charter
9 Id. at 140-41, quoting A. Rougier, "La Theorie de I'intervention d'humanite," 17
RGDIP 468, 525-526 (1910).
10 Id. at 140.
11 See, e.g., Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE
MODERN'WORLD 217-228 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974); Louis HENKIN, HOW NATIONS
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bars all use of force by one state against another.^^ Other publi
cists, however, took the position that the Charter did not prohibit
humanitarian intervention." Three arguments have generally been
offered in support of that position. First, one of the purposes
stated in the Charter is to promote human rights." An interpreta
tion of the Charter that prohibits humanitarian intervention would
have the contrary effect." Second, Article 2(4) prohibits the threat
or use of force against "the territorial integrity or political indepen
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations." If a state intervenes to protect
persons from imminent death or injury in another state, because
the latter is unwilling or unable to do so, and then withdraws, its
actions are not directed against "the territorial integrity or political
independence" of the first state, or otherwise "inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations."^® Interestingly, even Profes
sor Henkin, who has generally taken the position that the Charter
"prohibits the use of armed force by one state on the territory of
another ... for any purpose, in any circumstances,"^' would recog
nize some instances of humanitarian intervention as lawful on this
basis." The third argument is based on a state's right to use force
in self-defense, affirmed in Article 51. If a state's citizens are at
tacked or in imminent danger of attack in another state, its use of
BEHAVE 144-45 (2d ed, 1979); Jost Delbrilck, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention
Under the Authority of the United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887, 890, 892-93 (1992); Scheffer,

supra note 2, at 258-59.
12 Browniie, supra note 11, at 219; Henkin, supra note 2, at 41.
13 See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Browniie and
a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 230,
236 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974); Michael Reisman & Myres S. McDougal, Humanita
rian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED
NATIONS 172,175 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973).
1^ "The Purpose[s] of the United Nations are ... [t]o achieve international cooperation
... in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights." U.N. CHARTER, art. 1(3); See
also arts. 55, 56.
13 Reisman & McDougal, supra note 13; FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTER
VENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 158-59 (1988).
1® Reisman & McDougal, supra note 13, at 177, citing U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4); Rich
ard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 32534 (1967); John Norton Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in International Con
flict, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205 (1969).

12 Henkin, supra note 2, at 40.
18 Id. at 41-42. Thus, he stated, "But Israel could plausibly argue that in the circum
stances its raid at Entebbe was not a use of force against the political independence or
territorial integrity of Uganda, or in any other way contrary to any purpose of the United
Nations." Louis HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 145 (2d ed. 1979).
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force to rescue them constitutes lawful self-defense under Article
51.1' There are two problems with the last argument; (a) it greatly
broadens the concept of self-defense and (b) it limits humanitarian
intervention to citizens of the intervening state.^"
C. Post Cold War
The tenor of the argument has changed somewhat with the
end of the cold war. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, the fight
ing and atrocities taking place in various parts of the world, have
led some commentators to urge collective intervention under U.N.
auspices.^i Others, however, oppose humanitarian intervention
even by the U.N., or by states acting pursuant to U.N. authorization.22 They argue that the only exception in Article 2(7) to the
prohibition against intervention by the U.N. in matters that are
"essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state" is for en
forcement measures under Chapter VII; that Chapter VII applies
only if the Security Council finds a threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression; and that as long as the state's con
duct is not directed against another state it does not constitute a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression within
19 Schachter, supra note 1, at 155; D. W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 91-105 (1958).

.

20 It is not apparent why, if a state whose citizens' lives are in danger is unable to rescue
them, another state willing and able to do so should be prohibited from rescuing them.
Even more egregious in my view is the position that a state that intervenes to rescue its
own citizens may not rescue the citizens of other states.
21 Scheffer, supra note 2, at 258-59, 265. See also, Report of the Secretary General on
the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/46/
1 (1991). ("It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference with the essen
tial domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which
human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity
The case for
not impinging on the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States
would only be weakened if it were to carry the implication that sovereignty, even in this
day and age, includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic campaigns of
decimation or forced exodus of civilian populations.")
22 See Lori F. Damrosch, Commentary on Collective Military Intervention to Enforce
Human Rights, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 215, 219 (Lori
Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991); Tom J. Farer, An Inquiry into the Legiti
macy of Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL OR
DER 190-191 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991). While Boutros
Boutros Ghali did not address the question directly, he did not re-affirm the strong word
ing for humanitarian intervention in his predecessor's report in 1991, see supra note 20, and
seemed to limit it to situations where there is "consent of the affected country." See An
Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item
10 at para. 30, U.N. Doc. A/47/277 (1992).
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the meaning of Article 39. Therefore, the Security Council cannot
authorize intervention.^
IV.

CONCLUSION

Because I agree with those who take the position that the U.N.
Charter did not abolish the right of humanitarian intervention, I do
not think that U.N. action is necessary to authorize it. Nor do I
think that the Charter confers any special powers on the U N. to
take action in this area. In this respect, I agree with those who take
the position that Chapter VII of the Charter, which provides for
the imposition of various sanctions by the Security Council, includ
ing use of force against a state, is Umited to situations in which the
Security Council finds that there is "a threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression" under Article 39. That language
was clearly intended to apply to international threats to the peace,
not to internal acts.^ The Security Council can, of course, take the
position that the danger of imminent death or grave injury to a
large number of persons within a state also constitutes a threat to
international peace, as it did in condemning Iraq's repression of the
Kurds in 1991," as it did in authorizing use of force in Somalia in
1992 26 jjj today's interdependent world that may well be true in
most—if not all—such situations."
There is no objection to collective action under the auspices of
the U.N., should states wish to do so. We should be wary, however,
of limiting humanitarian intervention to collective action author
ized by the Security Council. The legality of humanitarian inter
vention should not be subject to the veto power of any one state.
The right of the Kurds not to be murdered by Iraq, the right of the
Somalis to receive the food sent to save them from starvation, was
not any less the year before the end of the cold war than it was the
23 See authorities cited supra note 21.
24 See, e.g., Statement of the Australian representative to the San Francisco Conference,
Doc. 969,1/1/39,6 UNCIO (1945), para. 16, that the last clause in what became article 2(7)
of the Charter, excluding enforcement measures under Chapter VII from the ban on inter
vention in matters that are within the domestic jurisdiction of a state was unnecessary,
because "[t]o take enforcement action for the restraint of aggression is not intervening in
any way at all in a matter of domestic jurisdiction." Id. at 440.
25 S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 858 (1991).
26 S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. (1992).
27 In his Report on the Work of the U.N., Sec. Gen. Perez de Cueillar stated, "It seems
to be beyond question that violations of human rights imperil peace," UNGA A/46/1
supra note 20, at 10.
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year after. Yet, under an interpretation of the Charter that would
permit humanitarian intervention only if authorized by the Secur
ity Council, the action taken to protect the Kurds and Somalis
could not have been taken legally two years earlier and similar ac
tion might not be legal two years from now, should one of the
permanent members decide to veto it because of its own political
interests.^®
I believe the customary rule of humanitarian intervention,
which permits unilateral action, should be reaffirmed. That some
states may misuse that right to intervene in another state for other
purposes, or fail to leave once the danger has been averted, is not a
reason to prohibit legitimate humanitarian intervention, any more
then we prohibit legitimate self defense, or any other right, because
it may be misused. Every legal right can be misused. Obviously,
where the right involves use of force the consequences are more
serious but, so are the consequences of a failure to act when people
are in imminent danger of death or serious injury.^'
I believe, however, that humanitarian intervention should be
defined narrowly and precisely both to get the broadest possible
support for its legality^" and to avoid criticism, such as Professor
Brownlie's, that "the opportunities for intervention will be very
many."^^ I would, therefore, limit humanitarian intervention to sit
uations in which there is danger of imminent death or injury, as
stated earlier. That is not to say that intervention cannot be legal
in other situations. I have argued elsewhere^^ that use of force in
support of a democratically elected government which is barred
28 The assumption that in the post-cold war era the veto will no longer be a problem
may not be correct. The situation in Russia is still unstable. The long range position of
China is unpredictable. Indeed, given the surprises of the last decade, even states we con
sider predictable may not be.
29 A state that uses force in another state based on unjustified claims of humanitarian
intervention, or fails to leave once the danger is over, is, of course, violating article 2(4)
and the Security Council can find that it has engaged in a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and take such measures as it deems appropriate under Chapter
VII.
30 Damrosch, supra note 21, at 215; "[T]he legal community has widely accepted that
the Charter does not prohibit humanitarian intervention by use of force strictly limited to
what is necessary to save lives." Henkin, supra note 2, at 41.
31 Brownlie, supra note 11 at 226.
32 See Malvina Halberstam, The Copenhagen Document: Intervention in Support of De
mocracy, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 163 (1993). See also. The Committee on International Arms
Control and Security Affairs and the Committee on International Law, The Use of Armed
Forces in International Affairs: The Case of Pananut, 47 N.Y.C.B. ASS'N. 607, 698 (1992),
dissenting statement of Malvina Halberstam.
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from taking office or deposed by force is and should be lawful. I
would not, however, include such use of force in the definition of
humanitarian intervention. It was not included in humanitarian in
tervention historically,^^ and, strong as the arguments are for the
use of force in support of a democratic government, they are not as
compelling morally as the arguments for the use of force to protect
those in imminent danger of death or grave injury. Limited to in
tervention to save those in danger of imminent death or grave in
jury and coupled with a requirement that the intervening state
withdraw once that has been accomplished, humanitarian interven
tion is not only lawful but obligatory, certainly morally, and per
haps, as Professor Tesdn argues very persuasively,^'* legally.

33 See Hiomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 46, 84-85 (1992).
34 Tes6n, supra note 15, at 111-23.

